Follow-up, some possibilities

The iconic representations of the Peircean concepts makes continued reasoning possible on the ground of inspection of the diagram. This inspection may at least take two forms.

  1. By continued reasoning on the ground of the underlying rules.
  2. By confronting the diagrammatic representations with practice.

I will here briefly illuminate both possibilities.


Inspection of the diagrams; an ontological, relational and conventional approach?

The question in which of the two scheme's - i.e. relations between sign, object and interpretant and a closer look at objects and interpretants - the triad qualisign, sinsign and legisign belong, is not easily answered. The relational aspect seems to coincide with the ontological one if we are dealing with monads. Against the background of the triadic systematic this inconvenience gives rise to the suspicion that the work is not finished yet, that a third respect needs to be distinguished. What could this respect possibly be?

In the ontological approach we look at what the sign (1.1), the object (1.2) and the interpretant (1.3) in itself are. This approach represents the first category.

In the relational approach we always look at the relations between of the sign aspects. The relations of the sign with itself (2.1=1.1?), the relations between sign and object (2.2) and the relations between sign and interpretant (2.3). It belongs to the second category.

If the Peircean system is correct there ought to be a third approach. Which approach could this possibly be?

At least the approach ought to be associated with the interpretant, which belongs to the third category. Could it be that in the third approach the conventions (the habit aspect) ought to get a place? Which would mean:

  1. The conventions that determine how the sign on itself will be read (3.1)
  2. The conventions that determine how the relations are interpreted between the object as presented by the sign and the object as it exists out there (3.2),
  3. The conventions that determine how the interpretant feels addressed by the sign in the process of semiosis (3.3).

Designprocesses: conventions

The suspicion that the two schemes, which I presented, are not sufficient has been strengthened by professional designers who gave arguments for or against particular solutions that could not be dealt with. Those arguments belong to two distinct categories:
  1. The ways in which the receiver reads a composed sign or a combination of signs.
  2. The ways in which the receiver sees the connection between the object as presented by the sign with the object that is supposed to exist independent from the sign, i.e. the dynamical object.

In order to understand the arguments I had to seek alternative notions. In the work of Gunther Kress (1996) and Umberto Eco (1972) I found some interesting possibilities.

This is not the place to analyse design-processes, that is the reason why I will confine myself to an indication of the problem.

One. The ways in which a sign is being read.

Gunther Kress points at the various conventions that exist concerning the ways in which composed images are read. At stake are matters as framing, the meaning effects of salience, of right - left and bottom - top distributions and of the linear or non-linear distribution of the component parts. (See Chapter 6 The meaning of composition)

Taking these matters into account goes further than analysing the subjoined mark into:

Logo NedTrain

Source:http://www.Nedtrain.nl/
Design: Guido van Breda

To take compositional matters into account is necessary while just naming the parts of speech is not in itself that interesting. At least as interesting is to find out why a component part announces itself as subject or as predicate and what the reasons are for reading a collection of component parts as an integrated whole with a meaning. We are dealing here with the graphical equivalents of the connective words, with colour, shape, structure, position, contrast, dimension and especially with our customs in reading those graphical marks as determining composition.


Two. The ways in which an object is (re)presented.

Kress and Eco point to the fact that signs claim their realitymode. Signs present themselves as part of specific discourses, for instance the discourse of commercials, of science, of the childrens world or of art. Compare the different ways in which a car may be represented. A sideview with four wheels drawn signifies the world of the child that draws what it knows. A glossy picture is soon associated with commercials. A car composed out of cubist forms raises the idea of art and a schematic representation with exploded views is associated with technique. The difference between these reality modes is not solely determined by the projection rules that govern the relations between object and representation (What elements are represented?), but also by semiotic markers like colour, differentiation, modulation and brightness of colour, grade of detail and the like. On the ground of our knowledge of the projection rules and such semiotic markers we know the kind of reality we are dealing with. (Kress, hfdst 5 Modality; designing models of reality; Eco, Hfst B.1 Die Visuellen Codes)

Many decisions in professional design practice deal with bringing the component parts in one reality mode. It seems to me that this kind of consideration my find a place in the Peircean system. In terms of a diagrammatic representation of the Peircean semiotics this would mean that besides an ontological and a relational survey, a third survey must be developed. In this survey the conventions may find a place that govern the way in which the composition is read, the reference is determined and the effects of signs are prepared.