j_(116,"3 interpretant",3,235,700,15,0,160,16,1,21314,0,"As with the object we may look at the interpretant from different perspectives. We can look at:\n1 the kinds of interpretants possible\n2 the ways a sign may address its interpretants.\n3 [Probably: the codes that rule the ways in which the interpreting mind: \na. reads composed signs, \nb. sees the way in which the sign represents the object, \nc. feels itself addressed by the sign.]\n\nSince the concept of interpretant is derived from the concept of sign I will start with 2.\n\n2 Relations sign - interpretant\nWhat are the ways in which a sign may address an interpretant?\n\nA sign may:\n1. call into the mind an idea \n2. state a relation between an idea and an object\n3. raise an interpreting thought that acts like a conclusion out of premises.\nSee: Rhematic, propositional, argumentative.\n\n1 the kinds of interpretants possible\n1. a feeling produced by the sign\n2. an effort of the body, of the mind or both\n3. a mental sign; this sign even may be a habit (change)\nSee also emotional, energetic and logical interpretant.\n\n\n\n------------\n")
j_(146,"1 hypothesis",5,-1524,1318,14,0,161,15,1,235418685,0,"Catchword: creativity\n\nHypotheses as a form of reasoning: \nAll humans are mortal\nX is mortal\nSo: x is human\n\nX could of course also be a cat. Hypothesis is very unreliable, but it is the only form of reasoning that may teach you something really new.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------------------\n")
j_(140,"ded1",6,-1309,1694,10,0,161,15,1,587352089,0,"")
j_(139,"ded2",6,-1054,1688,10,0,161,15,1,556091196,0,"")
j_(147,"2 deduction",5,-1195,1535,14,0,161,15,1,201798973,0,"Catchword: trying to work on routine.\n\nDeduction as a form of reasoning: \nAll humans are mortal\nX is human\nSo: x is mortal\n\nDeduction is a highly reliable form of reasoning. But nothing new can be learned from deduction.\n\nThere are two types of deduction\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------")
j_(145,"3 induction",5,-1798,1541,14,0,161,15,1,151536445,0,"Catchword: the formation of habit.\n\nInduction as a form of reasoning:\nPiet, Jan, Klaas and... are human\nPiet, Jan, Klaas and... are mortal\nSo: All humans are mortal\n\nYou will never be able to check all humans to find out whether they are mortal or not. This makes the inference less reliable than a deductive inference. But, the more cases you take into account, the more you can trust the conclusion.\nYou gain confidence but do not learn something really new.\n\nThere are three types of induction\n\n\n\n\n\n\n--------------\n\n")
j_(143,"ind1",6,-2564,1710,10,0,161,15,1,337179,0,"")
j_(142,"ind2",6,-2564,1860,10,0,161,15,1,0,0,"")
j_(141,"ind3",6,-2558,2029,10,0,161,22,1,117451799,0,"")
j_(148,"    making an inference ",5,-1528,1897,31,0,162,35,1,220877888,0,"")
j_(53,"Toggle:",3,-1517,540,15,0,170,14,1,34618395,0,"Click on 3 objects below to Toggle on/off each Level.")
j_(152,"Lev 3",0,-253,-921,15,44,161,4,1,0,0,"3")
j_(153,"sign",3,243,383,14,0,161,5,1,654603298,0,"\"Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C.\"\nPeirce: CP 1.346\nSee (A) representamen, (B) object, (C) interpretant\n\nTo distinguish \n1. the sign that meets the requirements of denoting an object and calling an interpretant\nfrom\n2. the sign as the object that does the job \nI use representamen to indicate the signobject.")
j_(165,"1 qualisign",3,-847,-40,2,0,160,10,1,486887996,0,"Qualisigns only have being as 'possibility to become embodied in a sign'. Imagine your whole consciousness filled with the impression of 'red', than you have the purest impression possible of a qualisign. They may be regarded as the primitive building blocks of signs, but beware for they are devoid of embodiment and they lack individuality. \n\nColour impressions, sounds, tactile impressions, impressions of taste en smell, but always in their most elementary form, without composition.\nSee also: Peirce: CP 2.244, 8.334, 8.335\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n")
j_(166,"2 sinsign",3,-843,126,2,0,160,10,1,704796732,0,"Sinsign is a derivation from singular sign. An individual combination of qualisigns with a here and now existence is a sinsign. \nEvery individual thing can be a sinsign. That single wreath of smoke for instance that you noticed while walking one day, or the particular occurrence of a symptom of an illness you once had. \n\nThe sinsign aspect rules the factual existence of our signs. See also: replica sinsign.\n\nAlso known as token.\n\nThe aura of a unique work of art, before the advent of its easy technical reproducibility has its foundation in the sinsign character.\n\nSee also: Peirce: CP 2.245, 8.334, 8.334\n\n\n\n\n-------\n\n")
j_(167,"3 legisign",3,-832,287,2,0,160,10,1,520508477,0,"Facing the big differences between different handwriting styles, how does it come that we can read and understand them? This capability is grounded in the legisign character of signs.\n\nA legisign is a law or a rule that functions as a sign. We never meet legisigns 'direct'; they need a (replica) sinsign for their embodiment. \n\nSo a legisign is a general type that bestows significance to its instances. The words 'one', 'One' en '1' differ in some respects (shape, place). Still we know that we are dealing with the same word. This is due to the legisign character of the sign. Conventional signs for instance are legisigns.\n\nAlso known as 'type'.\n\nSee: Peirce: CP 2.246, 8.334, 8.335\n\n\n\n\n--------------\n")
j_(169,"2 propositional",3,-467,701,2,0,160,10,1,201477690,0,"Making a statement.\n\nThe connection between sign and interpretant is propositional if an idea is being raised and in addition the idea is connected with an object. But a reaction other than 'it is true' or 'it is false' is not asked for. \n\nExamples:\nWithout any reason stating\n\"The first day of Christmas was a rainy day\" \nor\nWithout any reason presenting a trademark, for instance the NedTrain trademark, to someone. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------\n")
j_(173,"1 image",5,-1109,-468,14,0,161,15,1,152512819,0,"A not manipulated photograph approximates a pure iconic relation \n\n\n\n\n\n-----")
j_(180,"real reagent",5,1405,-666,29,0,160,15,1,489046845,0,"A real measure rod\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------")
j_(181,"discription of reagent",5,1529,-841,29,0,160,15,1,504578869,0,"If I say, I live two miles from the town centre, I claim that a measuring rod of a specified length fits x times in the distance between my house and the centre.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n--------\n")
j_(178,"replica of an index",5,311,-468,11,0,161,15,1,489046845,0,"Not a real index, but an index that needs conventions in order to be understood.\n\n\n\n\n\n-----")
j_(174,"replica of an icon",5,-408,-463,11,0,161,15,1,253637946,0,"Not a real icon, but an icon mediated by conventions.\nSee also icon.\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n\n")
j_(144,"conceptual scheme Peirce",6,358,2669,4,0,170,45,1,453005888,0,"In informal and quick style some remarks \nThis scheme gives Peirces:\n1. 'ontological' distinctions\n2. relational distinctions\n\nIf Pierce is right in his insistence on the triadic character of signs. A monadic, dyadic and triadic treatment must be possible. This scheme only gives the first two treatments. So a third treatment must be possible. The hypothesis is that this third treatment consists in a scheme that gives the conventions that rules the ways in which the interpretant follows:\n1.  conventions that rule the composition of signs and signscombinations\n2. conventions that rule the ways in which the sign connects to the object, how does the sign communicate the reality it is connected to? See for instance Kress on modality markers.\n3. conventions that rule signinterpretation\n\n\n\nProposed methods:\n1 trying to incorporate the Kress/Leeuwen work. But also Eco has some good remarks.\n2 investigation of professional designprocesses, i.e. processes in which signs are being generated (graphical work, new media). ")
j_(66,"replica sinsign",6,-2024,486,11,0,161,15,1,34612794,0,"An embodiment of a legisign is called a replica sinsign or also a replica of a legisign. \nThe words 'one', '1' and 'one' that appear here and now on your screen are three separate sinsigns. But only of course if we disrespect the instability of individual signs on a screen due to the refresh rate and the passage of time. Otherwise we have much more sinsigns.\n\n\n\n\n\n")
j_(164,"1",3,-523,139,2,0,164,2,1,219624255,0,"the science of semiotic has three branches. The first is called by Duns Scotus grammatica speculativa. We may term it pure grammar. It has for its task to ascertain what must be true of the representamen used by every scientific intelligence in order that they may embody any meaning.\nPeirce: CP 2.229\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------\n")
j_(156,"1 emotional interpretant",4,1151,607,3,0,161,15,1,1914434,0,"Something enters the interpreting mind, there is a mental, emotional unrest. This can be a very limited effect as when we try in vain to catch the attention of somebody working very concentrated, but also quite extensive like when we experience a piece of music or an action painting.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------")
j_(157,"2 energetic interpretant",4,1143,893,3,0,161,15,1,102384445,0,"It entered as a single act and settles as something potentially meaningful.\n\n1. In our body as an impulse\n2. In our mind\nSee mental and physical interpretant\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n")
j_(158,"3 logical interpretant",4,1101,1215,3,0,161,15,1,606007,0,"The sign after entering and settling itself in the interpreting mind may undergo some subsequent treatment:\n1. the sign is evaluated, begins to have its signifying effects.\n2. The sign results in action or not depending on the results of the valuation\n3. The results of the above treatment are evaluated. This may or may not result in a change of habit or expectations.\nSee: immediate, dynamic and normal interpretant\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n")
j_(154,"1 direct object",4,1147,100,3,0,161,15,1,187056957,0,"\"But it is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient but not immediately present Object.\"\nPeirce: CP 8.343\n\n\n\n-------\n\n")
j_(155,"2 dynamical object",4,1202,305,3,0,161,16,1,117910838,0,"\"..from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation.\"\nPeirce: CP 4.536\nSince the status of knowledge is problematic we may further distinguish different kinds of knowledge, according to their status.\nSee 1. knowledge and 2. knowledge\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n--------")
j_(168,"1 rhematic",3,-661,552,2,0,160,10,1,50743099,0,"Raising an idea.\n\nA rhematic connection exists between sign and interpretant if the interpretant is nothing else then an idea called forth. \nThere is no relation with a particular object at a particular time and place. \nThere is no possibility to take a stance, as when we are dealing with a propositional relation.\nAnd no reaction is asked for, like when we are dealing with an argumentative relation.\nIt is something like without reason uttering the sentence 'sheep with five legs' or inserting the SHELL mark. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n----------\n")
j_(163,"2",3,287,20,2,0,164,2,1,286475324,0,"\"..the science of semiotic has three branches...\nThe second is logic proper. It is the science of what is quasi-necessarily true of the representamina of any scientific intelligence in order that they may hold good of any object, that is, may be true. Or say, logic proper is the formal science of the conditions of the truth of representations.\"\nPeirce: CP 2.229 \n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n")
j_(171,"3",3,-216,493,2,0,164,2,1,85144889,0,"\"The science of semiotics has three branches. …The third, in imitation of Kant's fashion of preserving old associations of words in finding nomenclature for new conceptions, I call pure rhetoric. Its task is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another.\"\nPeirce: CP 2.229 \n\n\n\n\n---------\n\n\n\n")
j_(114,"1 representamen",3,-170,118,15,0,160,15,1,100688445,0,"\"Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C.\"\nPeirce: CP 1.346\nSee object, interpretant\n\nTo distinguish \n1. the sign that meets the requirements of denoting an object and calling an interpretant\nfrom\n2. the sign as the object that does the job \nI use representamen to indicate the signobject.\n\nTo consider a sign in itself is strictly speaking impossible, for we have in that case no way of dealing with the relations between a sign and the object(s) it stands for or the relations between a sign and the interpretant thought(s). In which case we drop the essence of the sign and look at it as if it were an object.\n\nStill, if, for the sake of analysis, we disregard the relations between on the one hand signs and on the other hand their objects and their interpretant thoughts and we look at all the signs we have met as if they stood aloof, what can we say about them?\n\n1. They have an internal structure or, in other words, they consist of combinations of qualities. \n2. They have a factual existence,  exist as individual entities. \n3. They represent general rules of understanding, that is to say, they exist as special instances of rules or conventions. \nSee qualisign, sinsign and legisign.\n\n\n---------\n\n")
j_(115,"2 object",3,605,116,15,0,160,16,1,117792576,0,"As with the interpretant we may look at the object from different perspectives. We can look at:\n1 the kinds of objects possible\n2 the ways a sign may stand for or is connected with its objects.\n\nSince the concept of interpretant is derived from the concept of sign, I will start with 2.\n\n2 relations between sign and object\nThere are three possible ways in which a sign may be connected to its objects. \n1. The sign is connected with its object through a similarity between sign and object.\n2. The sign may be physically connected with its object.\n3. The sign may be connected to its objects by convention or a habit that grew.\nSee: iconic, indexical and symbolic.\n1 the kinds of objects possible.\nIf we are confronted with a sign that states something about the world, then the sign itself presents an object that may be compared with the state of affairs in the world. This gives rise to a distinction between:\n1. the object as presented by the sign\n2. the object in the world that the sign aims at.\nSee immediate and dynamical object\n\n\n\n\n------------\n\n")
j_(182,"Auke van Breemen",1,-733,-556,0,12,170,11,8193,0,0,"")
j_(170,"3 argumentative",3,-267,848,2,0,160,10,1,33574466,0,"Influencing the interpretant.\n\nIf a sign has an argumentative relation to its interpretant thought, then:\n1. At least one idea is called up.\n2. A relation is being established between idea and object in order to make a judgement possible.\n3. A reaction is being asked for.\n\nAlways the argumentative relation involves several propositions. The propositions must be connected with each other in a correct way. \n\nAn informal example: A Nedtrain job opening in the Saturday newspaper to which the trademark of Nedtrain is attached.\n\nThe newspaper section in which the advertisement is placed together with picture mark, name and accompanying text must reinforce each other in such a way that a suitable candidate is going to react.\n\nThere are three main types of argument:\n1. hypothesis\n2. deduction\n3. induction\n\nEach of them has its own merits.\n\nDesign processes can be used to give a first rough impression of the different types of argument.\n\nUsually they start with a briefing in which the commissioner formulates the aims. The designer uses them for inspiration and guidance and starts making sketches. Often two or three main lines of thought are pursued. This results in some proposals. \nThis is the hypothetical stage in which new ideas are generated.\n\nThe proposals will be discussed with the commissioner. In ideal circumstances the different proposals will be evaluated against the background of the briefing statements. The later function as general rules with which the specific proposals are matched. The proposal that is most true to the general statement will be chosen for further development.\nThis is the deductive stage in which the ideal conclusion is that a specific proposal is an instance of a general rule (the set of aims).\n\nAfter finishing, let's say the trademark, the design is send into the world. This means that people are going to be confronted with instances of the design and instances of company behaviour. As a result interpretative habits are being generated.\nThis is the inductive stage.\nThis stage makes it possible for SHELL to drop the name out of its trademark.\n")
j_(160,"3 symbolic",3,721,-225,2,0,160,10,1,16802632,0,"Learning a 'language'\n\nBy far the most signs we encounter have a relation with their objects that is mediated by conventions. We are only able to make the connection because we learned rules.\n\nWords have a symbolic relation with their objects. We learned what kind of object are designated by 'horse', 'table' and mind. But there are lots of other kinds of symbols. Take for example the Nike trademark. You can't tell by the wing that it is pointing to a business and calls forth at the same time the idea of victory.\n\nSymbols can be iconic and/or indexical. \n\nIn languages like English a noun, like horse, is iconic. It aims at picturing objects. But also a complete story, for instance a metaphor, can be iconic. \n\nDemonstratives are indexical, they point at objects without conveying any information about them, like the word 'there'.\n\nIn trademarks we often encounter the combination of a picture mark with a company name. The picture mark often expresses in a iconic way what we may expect from the company that is designated by the indexical name. See for example the NedTrain trademark.\n\nBut beware:\n1. The name is typecast in a heavy type. This type is chosen in order to establish an iconic relation with the customary type in the branch that deals with heavy machinery. \n2. A footprint in the sand has an iconic and an indexical relation with its object at the same time. It is an icon because the form of the foot is a special instance (replica sinsign) of a legisign, i.e. the foot form. It is an index because somebody walked the sand and left the impression (real sinsign).\n(sinsign) karakter (het is een afdruk).\n\n\n\n------------")
j_(161,"2 indexical",3,229,-221,2,0,160,10,1,737082,0,"To indicate, designate what you are dealing with.\n\nA pure indexical relation exists between a sign and its object when they have a direct physical connection, like smoke and fire or the weathercock and the wind.\n\nBut as with iconic relation's conventions enter the game quickly. The pointer of a thermometer has a complicated and today logically mediated relation with the outside world.  \n\nAn index is a sinsign that has an indexical relation with its object.\n\nSee also: replica index\n\n\n\n\n\n----------\n")
j_(162,"1 iconic",3,-243,-218,2,0,160,10,1,352339263,0,"Expressing what something is like, saying something about some thing.\n\nAn iconic relation exists when the sign and object have characters in common. A not manipulated photograph is an example. But still a tricky one for the elements of photo and photographed reality do not correspond exactly, is not 1 to 1.\nIn a certain sense projection rules always play an important part in deciding how the icon is to be matched on reality. \nA point stressed heavily by Eco. \n\nFor instance, take a car and compare:\n1. drawing what you know,\n2. drawing what you see,\n3. drawing what you experience,\n4. drawing at abstraction level x,\nEtc.\n\nsee also designations\n\n\n\n\n---------\n")
j_(175,"3 metaphor",5,-407,-723,22,0,161,15,1,386549031,0,"Imagery language based on comparison. Metaphor is more symbolic than a diagram and a metonym.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------")
j_(177,"1 designations",5,285,-736,22,0,160,15,1,286016311,0,"A designation indicates the subject dealt with, it conveys the universe of discourse, that of scientific reality, commerce or other.\n\nPerhaps\nU. Eco's visual code's or\nG. Kress reality modifiers\nfit in this corner.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n----------\n")
j_(179,"2 reagents",5,860,-733,22,0,160,15,1,17515311,0,"\"Reagents are indices that may be used to ascertain facts.\"\nPeirce: CP 8.368\nA real measuring rod and the use of a distance description in a measure system are examples of the sub species.\nSee real reagent, description of reagent.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------\n")
j_(172,"1 diagram",5,-744,-916,22,0,161,15,1,85079852,0,"A diagram is a graphical representation of the relations between entities. The indices are not saturated, free for specific interpretations.\n\n\n\n\n\n-------")
j_(176,"2 metonym",5,-115,-922,22,0,160,15,1,168901432,0,"Imagery language based on a mutual relation, i.e. I saw a Van Gogh.\n\nThe physical relation between a painting and its painter is being used. But you have to know that such a relation exists in order to grasp the meaning.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n---------")
j_(47,"Lev 4",3,-1541,403,15,44,161,4,1,0,0,"4")
j_(49,"Lev 5",3,-1542,294,15,44,161,4,1,0,0,"5")
j_(50,"Lev 6",3,-1550,184,15,44,161,4,1,0,0,"6")
j_(188,"read this first",3,-1533,0,0,0,204,1,1,4079957,0,"Only for Axon file use: \n-  Best way to proceed is to start with toggling levels 4, 5 and 6 off!\n-  The grey oval with 'sentence' in it will cause an other file to open This file contains an example analysis .")
j_(88,"1 (knowledge)",6,2474,481,9,0,161,35,1,168183869,0,"What exactly an object is, is hard to decide. The opinions differ widely. The distinction between knowledge 1 and knowledge 2 has been made here to distinguish at least tentative between:\n1. our (individual or collective) knowledge of the realm of objects\n2. the ultimate knowledge that proves to hold true \n\nBut this does not make the distinction less problematic.\nFor a rather difficult story about what may count as an object see my: \n\n Objecten en contradicties \nDe jonge Peirce contra de jonge Wittgenstein.\nSee: http://www.semiotiek.nl/folder/theorie.html\n\nAppeared in: Verslag van de vierde Toogdag Peirce. Broek in Waterland 31, May 1991\n\n\n\n\n\n\n------\n\n")
j_(89,"2 knowledge",6,2463,725,9,0,161,35,1,252135234,0,"What exactly an object is, is hard to decide. The opinions differ widely. The distinction between knowledge 1 and knowledge 2 has been made here to distinguish at least tentative between:\n1. our (individual or collective) knowledge of the realm of objects\n2. the ultimate knowledge that proves to hold true \n\nBut this does not make the distinction less problematic.\nFor a rather difficult story about what may count as an object see my: \n\n Objecten en contradicties \nDe jonge Peirce contra de jonge Wittgenstein.\nSee: http://www.semiotiek.nl/folder/theorie.html\n\nAppeared in: Verslag van de vierde Toogdag Peirce. Broek in Waterland 31, May 1991\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n--------")
j_(90,"1 mental",6,2405,1229,9,0,161,35,1,504644413,0,"A sign gives rise to an effort. This may be a physical effort like when we follow a command: sit!\nBut more often this will be an exertion upon our internal world. But at this stage it is never the meaning of a concept, for the meaning is general while this effort is a single act.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-------\n")
j_(91,"2 physical",6,2415,1460,9,0,161,35,1,470040859,0,"A sign gives rise to an effort. This may be a physical effort like when we follow a command: sit!\n\n\n\n\n------\n")
j_(92,"1 immediate",6,2441,1698,9,0,161,35,1,503792425,0,"The immediate interpretant is the interpretant that arises when the ordinary meaning of the sign is being grasped. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-----")
j_(93,"2 dynamical",6,2436,1906,9,0,161,35,1,488522304,0,"The dynamical interpretant is the actual effect that the sign brings forth. It is the mental or physical reaction.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n-----\n")
j_(94,"3 normal",6,2389,2143,9,0,161,35,1,471744829,0,"\"Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object. I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist.\"\nPeirce: CP 4.536\n\n\n------\n\n")
j_(185,"sentence",3,1476,-359,10,6,162,8,1,0,0,"http://www.tte.nl/semiotiek/theorie/engelsdiagram/weather.xon")
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b_(116,115,0,2,2359307,0,"")
b_(116,157,0,0,3,0,"")
b_(116,156,0,0,2359299,512,"")
p_(74,1)
p_(52,2)
p_(5,12)
p_(216,22)
p_(3,4)
p_(366,11)
p_(350,20110)
p_(66,2)
p_(221,-30)
p_(228,35)
p_(65,11)
p_(316,-1)
p_(51,6)
p_(363,1)
p_(50,0)
p_(1,8)
p_(342,51)
p_(21,122)
p_(341,57)
p_(310,0)
p_(311,204)
p_(87,1)
c_(66,8)
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c_(164,8)
c_(88,8)